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The M'Naghten Rules and
Proposed Alternatives
Responding to overt and implied criticism of the M'Naghten Rules
for determining legal insanity to excuse criminal responsibility, Mr.
Hall proposes a national seminar or study by judges of the diverse
and perplexing problems they must face in deciding issues in this
field. He thinks that M'Naghten needs repair rather than replacement
and that a rough consensus might be attainable.

by Jerome Hall

IN

e

Distinguished Service Professor of Law, Indiana University

THE MARCH, 1963, issue of the
American Bar Association Journal,
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., after
stating that he would not even "by
the slightest intimation suggest" which
insanity test he thought preferable to
the M'Naghten Rules, "if indeed it has
yet been proved that any one of them
is better", proceeds directly to express
some very definite preferences on this
subject. 1
Thus, evidently referring to those
who defend the M'Naghten Rules, he
asks a startling and illuminating question: "How valid is the assumption
that morality and safety require punishment . . . of mentally ill people?"
This is startling because it seems to
suggest that defenders of the M'Naghten
Rules wish to have psychotic persons
punished. It is illuminating because it
indicates a lack of awareness of the
fact that the principal problems in this
area concern the meaning of "mentally
ill", the "knowledge" by reference to
which this is to be determined, and
how mental illness can best be decided
in a democratic society when the issue
is criminal responsibility. 2 One's concern is heightened by the justice's confidence in "medical assessment" as a
condition of release from imprisonment
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and by his evident opinion that there
is an obvious answer to the question
whether "mentally ill offenders" should
be sent to a hospital or a penal institution.
The M'Naghten Rules were propounded by English judges in 1843 in
Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. &
Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, in response
to inquiries from the House of Lords.
They hold that "to establish a defense
on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the
committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong". This test
has been and is followed (with some
glosses) in almost all American jurisdictions, except New Hampshire, Vermont and perhaps Illinois. In New
Hampshire, for instance, in State v.
Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (1869), the Supreme Court of that state formulated a
test holding that an accused is not criminally responsible "if the [unlawful act]
was the offspring or product of mental
disease ...".
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Durham Case Arouses
Interest in Insanity Rules
The present interest in insanity as
a defense in trials of criminal responsibility was aroused by the decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in
1954 in Durham v. United States, 214
F. 2d 862 in which the court held that
a defendant was not criminally responsible "if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect".
The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has refused, as have many other
courts, to follow the Durham rule, stat
ing: "We are of the opinion that the
following formula most nearly fulfills
the objectives just discussed: The jury
must be satisfied that at the time of
committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental disease
or defect, lacked substantial capacity
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is alleged
to have violated." 9
Another alternative to the M'Naghten
Rules is proposed in the Model Penal
1. Brennan, Law and Psychiatry Must Join
in Defending Mentally Ill Criminals,49 A.B.A.J.
239 (March, 1963).
2. These questions are discussed in HALL,

449-529
(2d ed. 1960).
3. United States v. Curens, 290 F. 2d 751

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW

(1961).

The M'Nagnten Rules
Code of the American Law Institute.
This provides:

sons charged with the commission of
crimes.

Justice Douglas Thinks
Durham Is Improvement

In a lecture a few years ago to a
group of psychiatrists, Justice William
0. Douglas hailed the Durham rule as a
great improvement on the "rigid", the
"arbitrary, fixed" M'Naghten Rules. 6
He first attributed the M'Naghten test
to political pressure, public clamor and
newspaper publicity, but later he said:
"The only warrant of the M'Naghten
rule of insanity was tradition." "To
most psychiatrists", be continued, the
Durham decision "was a break with
In his article Justice Brennan goes legal tradition that was long overdue."
on to state that "a glance at the tran- It has the great advantage of permitscripts in more than a handful of ting the psychiatrist to "speak to the
court and to the jury in the language
cases" convinced him that although an
of his discipline", he declared.
accused may be "legally sane", he may
"nevertheless [be] seriously disorJustice Douglas, in my opinion, was
seriously
mistaken in every one of
dered". Able psychiatrists, after considerable study of many cases, disagree these statements. Not the least signifion this, and experienced forensic psy- cant evidence of this is that an overwhelming majority of the judges who
chiatrists have said that the M'Naghten
have had an opportunity to pass on the
Rules operate: well and justly and are
5
question have rejected the Durham rule
preferable to alternative proposals.
and the psychiatry summoned in supThe Justice then asks: "Can a true
port of it. The irony of these implied
moral judgment be made about responand expressed criticisms of the
sibility for any act without delving
M'Naghten Rules is that these justices,
deeply enough into the actor's backcspecially sensitive to the protection of
ground .. .to attempt to explain the
civil liberties, do not realize that if the
whole man?" While no mention is
M'Naghten Rules are abandoned, the
made of anyone who wishes to limit
consequence will probably be a "tyrsuch an inquiry or of inevitable limitaanny of experts". 7 The vaunted "hutions of any legal or psychiatric inmanitarianism" of some psychiatrists
quiry, the implication regarding the
contemplates the long-term incarcerapresent law and its administration is
tion of vast numbers of persons who
plain and disturbing.
have violated no law, as well as the
Justice Brennan also refers to the detention of thousands of petty offend"distinguished Drs. Karl Menninger
ers for as long a time as the so-called
and Joseph Sotten" and he quotes ap- experts withhold their favorable progprovingly and at length from Judge nosis. It is unfortunate that these jusBazelon, the author of the Durham tices do not raise a question regarding
opinion, but he does not mention Drs. the touted claim that adequate knowlFrederic Wertham and Hervey M.
edge exists to discharge the above vital
Cleckley or other distinguished psyfunctions fairly and with warranted
chiatrists who hold a different opinion
assurance in the validity of the "exof the current law and of the forensic
perts' " decisions.
use of psychiatry. Finally, there is no
What is especially significant is the
reference to any of the judges of some
probability that if judges as able and
twenty jurisdictions, state and federal,
conscientious as Justices Brennan and
who have rejected the Durham rule Douglas lack the knowledge required
and other proposed alternatives to the to deal soundly with this problem, then
M'Naghten Rules, not even to the par- many other judges and lawyers are in
ticularly thoughtful opinion of the a similar situation. In sum, we face a
chief justice of the Supreme Court of
complex twentieth century problem
his own state in State v. Lucas, 30 N. J. whose solution requires much more
than sympathy with unfortunate per37, 152 A. 2d 50 (1959).
(1) A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease
or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this article, the
terms "mental disease or defect" do
not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise
4
antisocial conduct.

Informed Discussion
Shouldn't Be Curtailed
Can anything be done to remedy this
situation, especially in its relation to
issues of the gravest importance that
will no doubt be presented in due
course to the Supreme Court? Certainly
it would be a mistake for judges to
refrain from public speaking and
printed publication, for then important
potential contributions would not be
made and the occasional need for further study would be unknown.
It may be suggested, in the first
place, that when a judge delivers a
public lecture and has it published in
a widely read journal, it is both fair
and necessary that the views he expresses be subjected to the same sort
of searching criticism as the published
views of others. But objectivity is very
difficult to maintain when a justice of
the United States Supreme Court is
concerned.
Moreover, one can hardly ignore the
fact that although we avow a free
market in ideas as the best test of truth,
the heads of well-financed psychiatric
institutions and powerful officials enjoy
strategic positions in the formation of
public opinion. The implications are
alarming when a justice of the Supreme Court appears to have accepted
certain philosophical versions of psychiatry.
It would, of course, be absurd to
imply that either Justice Brennan or
Justice Douglas would approve any
philosophy that depreciated human
freedom. What troubles one is their
apparent failure to recognize the relationship to human freedom of the thesis
that everyone or that every criminal is
"mentally ill". What troubles, also, is
the apparent acceptance of the extremely broad meaning of "mental
illness" propagated by psychiatrists
whose philosophy is, quite consistently,
the utter repudiation of freedom, re4. Section 4.01, MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed
Official Draft) 66 (1962). See also, Schwartz,
The Model Penal Code: An Invitation to Law
Reform, 49 A.B.A.J. 447, at 449 (May, 1963).
5. HALL, Op. cit. supra at 519-520, passim.
6. Douglas, The Durham Rule: A Meeting
Ground for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 41 IowA
L. REV. 485 (1956).
and the
7. Werfiam, Psychoauthortariqanis
Law, 22 U. CmI. L. REv. 337 (1955).
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The Mobilized Reservist

Jerome Hall was educated at the
University of Chicago (Ph.B. 1922
and J.D. 1923). He also has degrees
from Columbia (Jur. Sc.D. 1935)
and Harvard (S.J.D. 1935). He has
taught law at the University of North
Dakota, Louisiana State University
and University of London, in addition to lecturing and writing widely.
sponsibility and other basic values of
democratic society. It is hardly possible to avoid the conclusion that what
is plainly needed is further study of
this difficult problem by judges and
practicing lawyers so that at least the
cogent questions can be raised.
National Seminar
Is Proposed
Can anything be done to facilitate
this and to assure a fair and informed
hearing of these problems? Given competent guidance, it would be possible
for an able lawyer or judge to acquire
a significant degree of critical competence in this area in a year of carefully planned reading and bimonthly
discussions. This could be done in seminars or round-table discussions in
which the M'Naghten adherents were
given a role and an opportunity equal
to that of the critics of the prevailing
law. Newspaper reporting and other
interference with dispassionate study
and uninhibited discussion, such as
stenographic or other recording, would
be barred. Efforts should be made to
avoid the connotations of "work"; instead everything should be done to
make the study enjoyable. The corn-
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pany of the judges interested in this
particular problem might be augmented
by the admission of thoughtful laymen,
legal philosophers, other scholars and
friends, so that a congenial atmosphere
conducive to discussion prevailed.
The Great Books method of study
depends on a discussion leader who
carries the major burden, and it allows
a larger number to participate than is
possible in a seminar where each participant is expected to report in some
detail on a particular problem. On the
other hand, in a discussion group, one
would participate only to the extent be
desired. In a seminar which met bimonthly for ten months, twenty participants would probably be the maximum number that could be accommodated.
Ten major phases of a basic problem, such as that noted above, could
be studied, one each month, with two
participants reporting each session,
preferably on opposed sides. The other
members would prepare for these meetings by reading from a carefully selected bibliography in order to participate meaningfully in the discussion of
their colleagues' reports. Each participant would also be preparing his own
report.
A small, able research staff would
be a valuable adjunct to the seminar or
discussion group. It might limit its
function to reporting on specific questions, e.g., how many psychiatrists are
there in this country, how many of
them have criticized the M'Naghten
Rules, what studies have been made to
determine whether psychiatric testimony is at present restricted.
Some Subjects for Discussion
The following program of a seminar
or discussion group is suggested as
illustrative. No preference is implied
as to the order of studying the various
problems and their formulation is not
wholly neutral since my purpose is,
also, to raise questions regarding current criticism of the M'Naghten Rules.
1. What are the principal meanings
of "disease"? Is mental illness like
physical illness, or is it so different
from it that even a very wide analogy
is misleading?
2. What is "science"? Is there an
intermediate type of knowledge between

American Bar Association Journal

science, rigorously defined, and common sense? Where should psychiatry
be placed, e.g., what of statements by
leading psychiatrists to the effect that
psychiatry is an art? What evidence is
there that psychiatrists (a) cure mental illness, (b) diagnose it correctly,
(c) can recognize that persons who
have not committed any harm are socially dangerous and (d) can accurately predict that certain individuals
will commit crimes if they are released
from hospitals or penal institutions?
3. What is an expert, e.g., does that
term imply that there is a body of
knowledge with reference to which all
or most "experts" agree? What isthe
basis of the position taken by some
social scientists that psychiatry has not
yet developed to the point where psychiatrists should be permitted to testify
in court as experts? What are the principal types or schools of psychiatry,
and what is the significance of divergent theories and divergent diagnoses?
What does this imply regarding the
common assumption that psychiatrists
are expert in classifying certain persons as "psychotic" or "insane"? If
these terms mean extreme and irrational deviation from social norms,
for instance, being a social nuisance,
is such labeling by a psychiatrist more
or less sound than that by an intelligent
jury?
4. Does psychiatry include expert
skill in elucidating such terms as
"right", "freedom", "justice", "punishment" and "responsibility"? What is
the special competence of psychiatrists? What is the significance of a
deterministic premise when employed
(a) in physical science, (b) in psychiatric research, (c) in therapy, (d)
in deciding whether a person should
be held criminally responsible for a
harm be committed?
5. The history of legal tests of insanity should be explored to ascertain
their relationship to the contemporaneous medical and psychiatric knowledge,
moral ideas and views of "human nature" and, also, to evaluate certain recent statements, e.g., that the M'Naghten Rules were merely the product of
political pressure, that a "wild beast"
test was ever actually a rule of law in
England in the implied literal sense,
and that lawyers have usually impeded
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the march of scientific progress while
doctors have facilitated it.
6. Important, also, is a comparative
study of American, English and Continental law, especially with reference
to the "irresistible impulse" test as a
complete alternative to the cognitive
(M'Naghten) test. On what grounds
has the Report of the Royal Commission, 1949-1953, so highly praised in
this country by critics of M'Naghten,
been criticized by English judges, for
instance, Justice Devlin? In the study
of Continental codes, the meaning of
the word "or" needs to be scrutinized
to determine whether its significance
is disjunctive or conjunctive. Continental cases should be studied to determine whether the position so vigorously
urged here by very articulate psychiatrists-that a person's cognitive faculties may be quite normal or even
superior but, nonetheless, he may be
unable to keep from committing the
actually acmost serious harms -is
cepted in European law. If it is found
to be recognized to some extent, is this
[lie effect of the early nineteenth century psychology of separate faculties,
which has been everywhere discarded,
or is it currently supported by able
European psychiatrists?
7. In the study of such social problems, the most difficult question often
is: What is the question or the proposal
that is nade? This requires logical
analysis of various arguments. For example, is it consistent with the psychology of integrated personality (that
man functions as a unit) to argue that
M'Naghten should be abandoned? Is it
consistent with that theory of psychology to argue that the volitional function can be seriously disordered but,
at the same time, the cognitive functions remain normal? Is it consistent
to assert that psychiatry does not deal
with human freedom, right and wrong,
responsibility, and justice, and to assert also that the right-and-wrong test
is a vestige of superstition and that
psychotic persons understand the difference between right and wrong?
Logical inquiry can also disclose the
areas where no assured answer can be
given to certain questions., e.g., whether
punishment deters, whether psychiatrists can rehabilitate criminals, and so

on. If "experts" in behavioral disciplines and psychiatrists do not have
all th desired answers, what is the
role of intelligent laymen in dealing
with such problems, and what of the
legal and ethical standards developed
by thoughtful persons in the course of
many centuries?
8. The characteristics and requirements of a democratic legal order
should be studied especially in relation
to tie role of unfettered officials, unfettered experts and unfettered juries.
Are the prevailing conceptions of human nature, individual responsibility,
freedom, right and wrong, as traditionally expressed in the rules of law
which guide judges and juries, to be
subordinated to the theories of psychiatrists and, if so, to which onesFreudian, neo-Freudian, anti-Freudian,
Jungian, Adlerite, existentialist, organicist, neurologist, Reikian, Frommian,
or eclectic? " Should tie selected experts be permitted to present any theories or opinions to juries who receive
no guidance from judges or laws?
9. There are still unsettled questions
about "punishment" to be studied;
they involve questions of public policy,
ethics and free discussion. There are
distinctions to be drawn between reforms, utopias and the relation of punishment to freedom and social responsibility. There are issues which concern
hospitalization and punishment, e.g.,
When is a "hospital" a penitentiary?
And again, if we cannot determine
whether punishment deters or whether
experts can rehabilitate offenders, what
is the status of so-called "retributive"
punishment?
10. Finally, efforts might be made
to formulate conclusions reached at the
end of the inquiry, which, presumably,
would correctly and precisely reflect
the various positions held at that time.
Evidently, also, some of the topics and
some of the methods of analysis indicated above would be dealt with or
employed at several meetings.
Study Has Values
Even Without Answers
There is, of course, no certainty that
a general agreement will be reached on
these difficult questions even after a
year's study: it is possible that one's
ultimate premises, one's "can't helps",

as Holmes put it, will persist to the
very end. But this does not imply that
painstaking inquiries are illusory or
mere "ideologies". The more defensible view is that such study takes one
closer to the relevant truths as well as
to a fuller appreciation of opposed
positions. Certainly the direction and
degree of tolerable compromise could
be more clearly discerned, and in the
practical realm of daily life in a democracy, that may suffice.
For me the existence of a significant
degree of human freedom is a "can't
help", as it is, no doubt, for Justices
Brennan and Douglas and the vast
majority of thoughtful Americans. So,
too, as regards moral values, e.g., that
after thinking about a problem it makes
sense to speak of "right" and "wrong"
actions. But human freedom and
moral values depend upon understanding-they imply the reasoning, generalizing, cognitive functions of the human mind. "Mental illness" in at least
some of its meanings deeply affects the
validity of these postulates and their
implications.
Seen in relation to these basic postulates, the M'Naghten Rules are neither
a political contrivance nor a mere tradition. They may he faulty in their
formulation, in emphasis on one phase
of personality and in connotating the
one-sidedness of the supporting psychology of the times. But despite its
defects, M'Naghten incorporates the
most important function of human personality in terms of criteria with which
a civilized body of criminal law must
be concerned.
M'Naghten Needs Repairs,
Not Abandonment
For that reason, what is relevant is
not the abandonment of M'Naghten,
but only its repair. Just as the Venus
de Milo is not neglected because an
arm is missing, just as the Winged Victory holds the place of honor in the
world's greatest art museum despite its
8. "We are forced to conclude that the
psychologically minded psychiatrist and his
organicisi colleague, though often members of
the same professional organizations, do not
talk the same language and do not have the
same interests. It is not surprising, then, that
they have nothing good to say to each other,
and that when they do communicate it is only
to castigate each other's work and point of
view." SzAsz, THE MYTH OR MENTAL ILLNESS 93
(1961).
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glaring defect, so, too, reform of the
present law should preserve what is
essential in the M'Naghten Rules. This
means the avoidance of completely
autonomous alternatives such as the
Durham rule, the American Law Institute's alternative proposal in terms of
lack of "substantial capacity ... to conform" and other forms of the "irresistible impulse" hypothesis. A test solely
in terms of "control of conduct" is
ambiguous because it is silent on the
crucial question: whether understand.

ing has anything to do with conduct.
To preserve the sound core of M'Naghten requires that the rationality of the
human mind (understanding, knowledge, appreciation) be included in the
proposed test, in which case it may, of
course, and probably should be, joined
to other major functions of the personality.9
There is sufficient acceptance of
these basic premises to warrant the
expectation that a very substantial
agreement can be reached on their ap-

Activities of Sections

Tracy H.
Ferguson

Section of
Labor Relations Law

THE SECTION OF Labor Relations
Law conducted spirited meetings at the
Association's 86th Annual Meeting,
with an extensive three-day program.
Supreme Court Associate Justice
Arthur J.Goldberg, a former member
of the Council of the Section, was a
featured speaker. His remarks will appear in a later publication of the Section.
Reports of the various committees
of the Section were presented and three
received extended attention.
The Committee on National Labor
Relations Board Practices and Procedure, headed by Edward Schneider of
Boston, Massachusetts, and J. Albert
Woll of Washington, D. C., reported
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recent revisions in the National Labor
Relations Board Rules and Regulations,
terming the changes a "substantial improvement". The Committee reported
that its liaison relations with the board
were improved and cordial, though
there are still some areas of disagreement.
Two committee reports provoked
floor debates. The ad hoc committee
known as "Gulf-Warrior" presented
majority and minority reports on a
resolution to amend Section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act to overturn the rules
set forth in United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Company, 363 U. S.574 (1960). After
debate, the minority report, which favored amendment, was adopted by a
vote of 62 to 49.
Another ad hoc committee-this one
known as "Atkinson-Sinclair" presented three reports, one representing
a neutral position. The resolution proposed amendment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in the light of Sinclair
Refining Company v. Atkinson, 370
U. S. 195 (1962), to permit issuance
of an injunction in violation of a nostrike provision of a labor contract.
The resolution was amended to provide
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plication to criminal responsibility, including the problem of mental illness.
The hazards are the traditions which
envelop and condition our attitudes towards the judiciary and the possibility
that powerful judges will be called on
to render extremely important decisions before they have studied this difficult subject. American realism, resourcefulness and candor should be
able to meet this challenge.
9. HALL, op. cit. supra at 521-522.

that no injunction may be issued except on notice and hearing and as
amended was adopted, 63 to 30.
A paper on "Labor Law Decisions
of the Supreme Court, 1962 Term" was
given by Clyde W. Summers of New
Haven, Connecticut. At the annual
luncheon meeting, Arnold Ordman,
newly appointed General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board,
was the principal speaker.
Guests of the Section at the meeting
were Frank W. McCulloch, Chairman
of the N.L.R.B., and John H. Fanning
and Boyd Leedom, members of the
board. Charles Donohue, Solicitor of
Labor of the United States Department
of Labor, participated in the workshop
session on fair labor standards.
The Membership Committee report,
submitted by William F. Joy and Robert M. Segal of Boston, Massachusetts,
Cochairmen, indicated a substantial
growth in the Section, with a membership now of 2,400.
The meeting concluded with the election of new officers and council members. Tracy H. Ferguson of Syracuse,
New York, was elected Chairman and
Louis Sherman of Washington, D. C.,
Vice Chairman. Robert F. Koretz, who
is Professor of Law at Syracuse University, is the new Secretary of the
Section. New members of the Council
are Frank A. Constangy of Atlanta,
Georgia, and David Previant of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

